Summary
• A quantitative analysis of the real effects of financial segmentation across countries.
This paper:
• Provides evidence of the decline in cross-border banking after the financial crisis of 2008.
• Develops a multi-country model where banks' endogenous allocation of funds across countries feeds into firms' access to capital and then output.
○ "Financial segmentation" is a friction to cross-border lending.
• Calibrate the model to assess the quantitative effect of financial segmentation on output.
○ changes in frictions that match the decline in cross-border lending in the data explain ≈ 23% of output gap in Europe. • N asymmetric countries.
The Ingredients of the Model
○ Differences in TFP, production technologies, factor endowments.
• Within a country: a representative household, a representative firm, a bank.
• The household deposits its (exogenous) savings in the domestic bank, which lends them to firms located both domestically and abroad.
• The bank is owned by the representative household: allocates funds to maximize the household's utility.
• What drive the bank's allocation?
○ Efficiency: allocate funds in countries with higher returns; and ○ Risk Diversification: allocating capital in multiple countries diversifies away the risk from country-specific fluctuations in TFP.
• Firms use labor and capital they rent from banks to produce output. • Show pencil and paper solution of a simplified version the model:
Conveying the Intuition with a Simpler Exercise
○ two countries, and ○ deterministic TFP.
• In this scenario the only incentive for global banking is to achieve possibly higher returns: only the efficiency motive is present, no diversification motive.
• Except for a knife-edge case, the simpler model exhibits geographic concentration in banking. 
• In a deterministic environment, the bank always adopts a corner solution: pervasive domestic lending (φ ii = 1) or pervasive cross-border lending (φ ii = 0).
[⇒ Go to Proof]
• In a two-country world, banks from both countries invest in the highest return country: no bilateral cross-border lending.
[ 
[⇒ Go to Proof]
• Once solved for φ ii , market clearing delivers K i , the firm's equilibrium conditions deliver w i , R ii , while cross-border returns are given by the assumption on financial fragmentation. • Uncertainty (TFP shocks) is the driver of spatial diversification in lending across countries.
• Do we really believe that banks lend in multiple countries only to diversify risk? • Uncertainty (TFP shocks) is the driver of spatial diversification in lending across countries.
• Do we really believe that banks lend in multiple countries only to diversify risk?
• Other possible explanations:
○ Market access and profit maximization (not in this paper).
○ Regulatory arbitrage: can we interpret θ j as such?
• Some evidence against the diversification motive of foreign activities: Fillat, Garetto, and Oldenski (2015) . 
Drivers of Cross-Border Banking

Market Access and Profit Maximization
• Banks maximize profits from lending and lend in foreign countries to expand the size of their market.
○ Motive featured in Niepmann (2016), Fillat, Garetto and Goetz (2015) .
○ Exploits heterogeneity within the banking sector and (possibly) across countries.
○ Generates cross-border banking and bilateral banking flows also across deterministic and symmetric economies. 
Regulatory Arbitrage and Aggregate Bank Inflows
The dependent variable is aggregate bank inflows to 120 recipient countries, which is defined as 100 times the log-difference of total foreign claims (FCr) of 26 source countries to recipient country r, that is, 100 × ln( sFCsr). For columns (1) to (7) Table I . Time-fixed effects and recipient country-specific effects are included in the regressions but not reported. p-values are computed using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for recipient countries and are presented in brackets. * , * * , and * * * represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The scope of the paper is to "identify changes in supply of credit across political boundaries in Europe".
In the model:
• The amount of loans originating from a country is exogenous.
• The returns of cross-border loans are exogenous (R ij = R jj e −θ j ).
• The decrease in cross-border loans after the crisis is exogenous (θ j ↑). The scope of the paper is to "identify changes in supply of credit across political boundaries in Europe".
• The decrease in cross-border loans after the crisis is exogenous (θ j ↑).
More realistically:
• The amount of loans in each country should depend on bank supply characteristics (efficiency, scale, management costs...) and on agents' loan demand.
• The returns of cross-border loans should equilibrate demand and supply for those loans.
• The decrease in cross-border loans after the crisis should be endogenous, and depend on an exogenous shock like the tightening of capital requirements. • Fillat, Garetto, and Goetz (2015) develop a model featuring:
○ Loans, deposits, and interbank market activity that are endogenous and heterogeneous at the bank level and within bank across countries.
○ Endogenous interest rates on loans and deposits.
○ Capital requirements modeled following the Basel guidelines. A tightening of the capital requirement endogenously feeds into equilibrium loans at the bank-country level.
• Model is solved for two countries only and hard to simulate because of non-smooth profit functions deriving from occasionally binding constraints. • Fillat, Garetto, and Goetz (2015) develop a model featuring:
• Model is solved for two countries only and hard to simulate because of non-smooth profit functions deriving from occasionally binding constraints.
In the trade-off between realism and analytical/computational feasibility it is important to motivate modeling choices. How to measure financial integration in the data?
• This paper: incoming cross-border loans (CB) as a share of total loans.
○ Total loans are the sum of cross-border (CB) and "domestic" loans. ○ "Domestic" loans are "total claims outstanding by resident banks of the respective country", so the concept of "domestic" is based on residence, not on nationality.
○ Example: when computing loans to Germany, the loans of affiliates of Italian multinational banks located in Germany are considered domestic loans. How to measure financial integration in the data?
○ Example: when computing loans to Germany, the loans of affiliates of Italian multinational banks located in Germany are considered domestic loans. • I prefer to think of financial integration in a way that is analogous to trade and FDI openness: A simple calculation (with US data) to quantify the role of banking FDI for the measurement of financial integration.
• Domestic loans and loans from banking FDI from the Share Data for US Offices of Foreign Banking Organizations (Selected Assets and Liabilities of Domestic and Foreign Owned US Commercial Banks plus US Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks).
• Cross-border loans from BIS Statistics (Cross-border positions reported by banking offices located in BIS reporting areas).
• All data are in million US$. • Conceptually incorrect to classify the loans of multinational banks as "domestic": the activities of multinational banks are an important manifestation of financial integration.
• Disregarding the activities of multinational banks has the effect of:
○ Underestimating financial integration in each year of the sample.
○ Likely overestimate the reduction in financial integration after the crisis (as multinational banks are likely to be more resilient than domestic banks). In a deterministic environment, the bank always adopts a corner solution: φ ii = 1 or φ ii = 0.
The bank's first-order condition is:
By contradiction, suppose there is an interior solution: φ ii ∈ (0, 1): then λ L = λ U = 0. There are three possible scenarios:
1. If R ii > R ij , the marginal utility of consumption is always positive, so the first order condition is never satisfied and it must be that φ ii = 1 (pervasive domestic banking).
2. If R ii < R ij , the marginal utility of consumption is always negative, so the first order condition is never satisfied and it must be that φ ii = 0 (pervasive cross-border banking).
3. If R ii = R ij , then φ ii is undetermined, as banks are indifferent about where to lend. In a two-country world, banks from both countries invest in the highest return country.
Equilibrium in the Simple Deterministic Model
WLOG, assume that Italy (country i) invests in Germany (country j): R ii < R ij = e θ j R jj .
Hence:
The two-country model does not predict bilateral cross-border banking.
